queued 2026-09-25 00:25:05 · started 00:25:13 · finished 00:25:15 · duration 1s · target v3.0.0 · chromium · trigger: cli-adopted · batch: 8 tests (terminal)
Activity replay 1 frames, captured only while the page was actually changing — idle waits are skipped automatically
+0.00s
Step timings follows the replay — click a step to see it there
| at | step | took |
|---|---|---|
| +0.61s | goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/ | 81 ms |
| +0.69s | fill #name | 88 ms |
| +0.78s | fill #email | 12 ms |
| +0.79s | select_option #priority | 21 ms |
| +0.88s | click #submit-btn | 50 ms |
| +0.93s | wait_for_selector #result | 52 ms |
| +1.03s | inner_text #result | 5 ms |
Times are when each step began, on the replay's clock. Add your own phases with
with ctx.timed("label"):.
Screenshots
Artifacts
| Run log | run.log |
| Playwright trace | trace.zip
open with: playwright show-trace trace.zip |
| Result JSON | result.json |
| Folder | results/DEMO-002/20260925-002513-r452/ |
Full log
Read from the S3 bucket (the last 20 KB; the whole file is the Run log link above).
[harness] test=DEMO-002 browser=chromium headed=False timeout=120s [harness] target: http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/ [test] [ 0.61s] starting DEMO-002 [timing] goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/: 81ms [timing] fill #name: 88ms [timing] fill #email: 12ms [timing] select_option #priority: 21ms [test] [ 0.88s] screenshot: 01-form-filled.png [timing] click #submit-btn: 49ms [timing] wait_for_selector #result: 52ms [test] [ 0.98s] form submitted [test] [ 1.03s] screenshot: 02-form-result.png [timing] inner_text #result: 5ms [test] [ 1.04s] PASSED [harness] security: 0 high, 2 medium, 1 low [harness] saved trace.zip [harness] result: passed
Security observations what the browser noticed while this ran — not a penetration test
| Severity | Finding | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| medium | The application is served over plain HTTP http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/ is not HTTPS, so anything typed into it travels the network in the clear and can be modified in transit. |
On an isolated lab network this may be a deliberate choice -- if so, note it and move on. Anywhere else, terminate TLS in front of the application. |
| medium | Missing Content-Security-Policy Without it, an injected script can run with the page's full privileges. This is the single most effective header against XSS. |
Set the Content-Security-Policy response header on the application or its reverse proxy. |
| low | Response advertises software version (server) server: pw-testhub -- this tells an attacker exactly what to look up known vulnerabilities for. |
Suppress or blank the server header at the proxy. |
| info | Cookie 'csrftoken' is readable by JavaScript (expected) This looks like a CSRF token, which the page's own JavaScript has to read in order to send it back. HttpOnly would break that. Nothing to do -- listed so you know it was checked and not missed. |
No action. Do check that SESSION cookies are HttpOnly. |
All of these appear together on the Security page.