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Run #299 — DEMO-010

passed
📄 Download report

queued 2026-09-24 18:57:59 · started 18:58:47 · finished 18:58:50 · duration 2s · target v2.1.0 · chromium · trigger: cli-adopted · batch: 8 tests (terminal)

Activity replay 2 frames, captured only while the page was actually changing — idle waits are skipped automatically

activity frame
+0.00s

Step timings follows the replay — click a step to see it there

atsteptook
+0.71s goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/ 168 ms
+0.88s inner_text #hero-title 42 ms
+0.92s get_attribute meta[name="app-version"] 21 ms
+1.11s ⏱ track a shipment in transit 389 ms
+1.11s goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/track/ 89 ms
+1.20s fill #track-id 70 ms
+1.27s click #track-btn 162 ms
+1.43s wait_for_selector #track-result, #track-not-found 68 ms
+1.49s inner_text #track-status 7 ms
+1.50s inner_text #track-destination 8 ms
+1.64s goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/track/ 44 ms
+1.64s ⏱ track an unknown number 243 ms
+1.68s fill #track-id 47 ms
+1.73s click #track-btn 106 ms
+1.83s wait_for_selector #track-result, #track-not-found 45 ms

Times are when each step began, on the replay's clock. Add your own phases with with ctx.timed("label"):.

Screenshots

01-home.png
01-home.png
02-tracking.png
02-tracking.png

Artifacts

Run logrun.log
Playwright trace trace.zip open with: playwright show-trace trace.zip
Result JSONresult.json
Folderresults/DEMO-010/20260924-185847-r299/

Full log

Read from the S3 bucket (the last 20 KB; the whole file is the Run log link above).

[harness] test=DEMO-010 browser=chromium headed=False timeout=120s
[harness] target: http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/
[test] [   0.71s] starting DEMO-010
[timing] goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/: 168ms
[timing] inner_text #hero-title: 42ms
[timing] get_attribute meta[name="app-version"]: 21ms
[test] [   0.94s] Acme Freight says it is release 2.1.0
[test] [   1.11s] screenshot: 01-home.png
[timing] goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/track/: 89ms
[timing] fill #track-id: 70ms
[timing] click #track-btn: 162ms
[timing] wait_for_selector #track-result, #track-not-found: 68ms
[timing] track a shipment in transit: 389ms
[timing] inner_text #track-status: 7ms
[timing] inner_text #track-destination: 8ms
[test] [   1.64s] screenshot: 02-tracking.png
[timing] goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/track/: 44ms
[timing] fill #track-id: 47ms
[timing] click #track-btn: 106ms
[timing] wait_for_selector #track-result, #track-not-found: 45ms
[timing] track an unknown number: 243ms
[test] [   1.89s] PASSED
[harness] security: 1 high, 3 medium, 1 low
[harness] saved trace.zip
[harness] saved video.webm
[harness] result: passed

Security observations what the browser noticed while this ran — not a penetration test

SeverityFindingWhat to do
high The page requested resources from other hosts
Requests went to: analytics.acme-metrics.invalid (5). On an air-gapped network these cannot succeed -- so the page is either broken or waiting on a timeout -- and each one is a path by which data could leave the enclave.
Vendor the resource locally, or remove the reference. This is worth chasing even when the page still appears to work.
medium The application is served over plain HTTP
http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/ is not HTTPS, so anything typed into it travels the network in the clear and can be modified in transit.
On an isolated lab network this may be a deliberate choice -- if so, note it and move on. Anywhere else, terminate TLS in front of the application.
medium Missing Content-Security-Policy
Without it, an injected script can run with the page's full privileges. This is the single most effective header against XSS.
Set the Content-Security-Policy response header on the application or its reverse proxy.
medium Missing X-Frame-Options (or CSP frame-ancestors)
Without it, another site can embed this page invisibly and trick a user into clicking things (clickjacking).
Set the X-Frame-Options (or CSP frame-ancestors) response header on the application or its reverse proxy.
low Response advertises software version (server)
server: pw-testhub -- this tells an attacker exactly what to look up known vulnerabilities for.
Suppress or blank the server header at the proxy.
info Cookie 'csrftoken' is readable by JavaScript (expected)
This looks like a CSRF token, which the page's own JavaScript has to read in order to send it back. HttpOnly would break that. Nothing to do -- listed so you know it was checked and not missed.
No action. Do check that SESSION cookies are HttpOnly.

All of these appear together on the Security page.