queued 2026-09-24 18:57:59 · started 18:58:41 · finished 18:58:43 · duration 1s · target v2.1.0 · chromium · trigger: cli-adopted · batch: 8 tests (terminal)
What went wrong
AssertionError: session fixation: the session id did not change at sign-in, so anyone who knew the old id now holds a signed-in staff session
Technical details (full error)
AssertionError: session fixation: the session id did not change at sign-in, so anyone who knew the old id now holds a signed-in staff session
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/opt/pw-testhub/app/core/harness/run_test.py", line 737, in main
module.run(TimedPage(page, ctx), ctx)
File "/opt/pw-testhub/data/tests/DEMO-012__freight_signin_security.py", line 40, in run
assert after != before, (
AssertionError: session fixation: the session id did not change at sign-in, so anyone who knew the old id now holds a signed-in staff session
the page at the moment it failed
Activity replay 2 frames, captured only while the page was actually changing — idle waits are skipped automatically
+0.00s
Step timings follows the replay — click a step to see it there
| at | step | took |
|---|---|---|
| +0.64s | goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/login/ | 150 ms |
| +0.80s | fill #username | 56 ms |
| +0.85s | fill #password | 26 ms |
| +0.88s | click #login-btn | 140 ms |
| +1.03s | wait_for_selector #signed-in-user | 201 ms |
Times are when each step began, on the replay's clock. Add your own phases with
with ctx.timed("label"):.
Screenshots
Artifacts
| Run log | run.log |
| Playwright trace | trace.zip
open with: playwright show-trace trace.zip |
| Result JSON | result.json |
| Folder | results/DEMO-012/20260924-185841-r301/ |
Full log
Read from the S3 bucket (the last 20 KB; the whole file is the Run log link above).
[harness] test=DEMO-012 browser=chromium headed=False timeout=120s [harness] target: http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/ [test] [ 0.64s] starting DEMO-012 [timing] goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/login/: 150ms [test] [ 0.80s] logging in [timing] fill #username: 56ms [timing] fill #password: 26ms [timing] click #login-btn: 140ms [timing] wait_for_selector #signed-in-user: 201ms [test] [ 1.32s] screenshot: 01-signed-in.png [test] [ 1.32s] FAILED: session fixation: the session id did not change at sign-in, so anyone who knew the old id now holds a signed-in staff session [harness] security: 2 high, 3 medium, 1 low [harness] saved failure.png [harness] saved trace.zip [harness] result: failed
Security observations what the browser noticed while this ran — not a penetration test
| Severity | Finding | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| high | The page requested resources from other hosts Requests went to: analytics.acme-metrics.invalid (2). On an air-gapped network these cannot succeed -- so the page is either broken or waiting on a timeout -- and each one is a path by which data could leave the enclave. |
Vendor the resource locally, or remove the reference. This is worth chasing even when the page still appears to work. |
| high | The session cookie 'sessionid' did not change when logging in The identifier issued before authentication is still in use afterwards. Anyone who knew the earlier value -- from a shared link, a proxy log, or by setting it themselves -- now holds an authenticated session. |
Regenerate the session on login (Django: django.contrib.auth.login does this; check custom flows). |
| medium | The application is served over plain HTTP http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/ is not HTTPS, so anything typed into it travels the network in the clear and can be modified in transit. |
On an isolated lab network this may be a deliberate choice -- if so, note it and move on. Anywhere else, terminate TLS in front of the application. |
| medium | Missing Content-Security-Policy Without it, an injected script can run with the page's full privileges. This is the single most effective header against XSS. |
Set the Content-Security-Policy response header on the application or its reverse proxy. |
| medium | Missing X-Frame-Options (or CSP frame-ancestors) Without it, another site can embed this page invisibly and trick a user into clicking things (clickjacking). |
Set the X-Frame-Options (or CSP frame-ancestors) response header on the application or its reverse proxy. |
| low | Response advertises software version (server) server: pw-testhub -- this tells an attacker exactly what to look up known vulnerabilities for. |
Suppress or blank the server header at the proxy. |
| info | Cookie 'csrftoken' is readable by JavaScript (expected) This looks like a CSRF token, which the page's own JavaScript has to read in order to send it back. HttpOnly would break that. Nothing to do -- listed so you know it was checked and not missed. |
No action. Do check that SESSION cookies are HttpOnly. |
All of these appear together on the Security page.