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Run #304 — DEMO-015

passed
📄 Download report

queued 2026-09-24 18:57:59 · started 18:58:03 · finished 18:58:08 · duration 5s · target v2.1.0 · chromium · trigger: cli-adopted · batch: 8 tests (terminal)

Activity replay 6 frames, captured only while the page was actually changing — idle waits are skipped automatically

activity frame
+0.00s

Step timings follows the replay — click a step to see it there

atsteptook
+0.62s goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/login/ 140 ms
+0.75s fill #username 46 ms
+0.80s fill #password 13 ms
+0.82s click #login-btn 132 ms
+0.95s wait_for_selector #signed-in-user 233 ms
+1.18s goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/ops/import/ 63 ms
+1.25s set_input_files #manifest-file 135 ms
+1.38s click #upload-btn 136 ms
+1.38s ⏱ process the manifest 3.18 s
+1.52s wait_for_selector #job-result, #job-failed 3.03 s
+4.55s get_attribute #job 10 ms
+4.55s inner_text #import-ok 9 ms
+4.56s inner_text #import-errors 7 ms
+4.70s click #download-result 40 ms

Times are when each step began, on the replay's clock. Add your own phases with with ctx.timed("label"):.

Screenshots

01-import-result.png
01-import-result.png

Artifacts

Run logrun.log
Playwright trace trace.zip open with: playwright show-trace trace.zip
Result JSONresult.json
Saved by the test manifest-results.csv
manifest.csv
Folderresults/DEMO-015/20260924-185803-r304/

Full log

Read from the S3 bucket (the last 20 KB; the whole file is the Run log link above).

[harness] test=DEMO-015 browser=chromium headed=False timeout=150s
[harness] target: http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/
[test] [   0.61s] starting DEMO-015
[timing] goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/login/: 140ms
[timing] fill #username: 46ms
[timing] fill #password: 13ms
[timing] click #login-btn: 132ms
[timing] wait_for_selector #signed-in-user: 233ms
[test] [   1.18s] signed in as tester
[timing] goto http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/freight/ops/import/: 63ms
[timing] set_input_files #manifest-file: 135ms
[timing] click #upload-btn: 135ms
[timing] wait_for_selector #job-result, #job-failed: 3032ms
[timing] get_attribute #job: 10ms
[timing] process the manifest: 3177ms
[timing] inner_text #import-ok: 9ms
[timing] inner_text #import-errors: 7ms
[test] [   4.57s] 27 rows priced, 3 with problems
[test] [   4.67s] screenshot: 01-import-result.png
[timing] click #download-result: 40ms
[test] [   4.75s] downloaded manifest-results-de0440ef9c12.csv
[test] [   4.75s] PASSED
[harness] security: 1 high, 3 medium, 1 low
[harness] saved trace.zip
[harness] saved video.webm
[harness] result: passed

Security observations what the browser noticed while this ran — not a penetration test

SeverityFindingWhat to do
high The page requested resources from other hosts
Requests went to: analytics.acme-metrics.invalid (5). On an air-gapped network these cannot succeed -- so the page is either broken or waiting on a timeout -- and each one is a path by which data could leave the enclave.
Vendor the resource locally, or remove the reference. This is worth chasing even when the page still appears to work.
medium The application is served over plain HTTP
http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo/ is not HTTPS, so anything typed into it travels the network in the clear and can be modified in transit.
On an isolated lab network this may be a deliberate choice -- if so, note it and move on. Anywhere else, terminate TLS in front of the application.
medium Missing Content-Security-Policy
Without it, an injected script can run with the page's full privileges. This is the single most effective header against XSS.
Set the Content-Security-Policy response header on the application or its reverse proxy.
medium Missing X-Frame-Options (or CSP frame-ancestors)
Without it, another site can embed this page invisibly and trick a user into clicking things (clickjacking).
Set the X-Frame-Options (or CSP frame-ancestors) response header on the application or its reverse proxy.
low Response advertises software version (server)
server: pw-testhub -- this tells an attacker exactly what to look up known vulnerabilities for.
Suppress or blank the server header at the proxy.
info Cookie 'csrftoken' is readable by JavaScript (expected)
This looks like a CSRF token, which the page's own JavaScript has to read in order to send it back. HttpOnly would break that. Nothing to do -- listed so you know it was checked and not missed.
No action. Do check that SESSION cookies are HttpOnly.

All of these appear together on the Security page.